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UNITED STATES v BYRUM-THE· MANAGEMENT POWER 
QUESTION IN ESTATE TAXATION 
The Supreme Court recently approved a techmque wluch permits 
the holder of a majority mterest m a close corporatIon to reduce lus 
estate tax burden sIgmficantly wIthout relinqUlslung lifetIme control 
over the busmess.1 In Untted States 'V. Byrum;}, the Supreme Court 
affirmed the prmcIple that a settlor may retam broad management powers 
over property transferred to an Irrevocable trust wIthout suffermg the 
adverse effect of havmg that property mcluded m lus gross estate.s Sec-
tion 20364 of the Internal Revenue Code5 provIdes that the gross estate 
will mclude property transferred by the decedent If he has retained 
certam proscribed rIghts m the property conveyed during hIS lifetIme.6 
It is frequently the objectIve of the taxpayer to retam maXImum 
powers over the property transferred wIthout encounterIng the costly 
consequences of sectIon 2036 and Its compamons, sectIon 2037 and sec-
tion 2038.7 Tlus objectIve IS partIcularly lffiportant where the stock 
1. 92 S. Ct. 2382 (1972). 
2.Id. 
3. "Management powers" or "powers of adrrurustratlon" Include, among others, the 
powers to sell and Invest, to exchange trust property, to vote trust Investlnents, and 
to allocate receIpts between corpus and Income. ThIS Comment IS pnmarily concerned 
wIth the power to vote the stock In trust. For a disCUSSIon of thIs subject see Gray & 
Covey, State Street-A Case Study of Sectfons 2036(a) (2) and 2038, 15 TAX L. REv. 75 
(1959) (hereInafter cIted as Gray & Covey]; Pednck, Grantor Powers and Estate Taxa-
tIon: The Ties That Bind, 54 Nw U.L. REv. 527, 552 (1959) (hereInafter cIted as. 
Pednck]. 
4. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2036(a) prOVIdes In relevant part: 
(a) General Rule-The value of the gross estate shall Include the value 
of all property to the extent of any Interest therem of whIch the decedent 
has at any tlme made a transfer by trust or otherWISe, under whIch 
he has retaIned for hIS life or for any penod not ascertamable wIthout refer-
ence to hIS death or for any penod whIch does not In fact end before hIS 
death-
(1) the posseSSIOn or enjoyment of, or the nght to the Income from, 
the property, or 
(2) the nght, eIther alone or In conJunctlon wIth any person, to des-
Ignate the persons who shall possess or enJoy the property or the m-
come therefrom. 
5. All textual references to the "Internal Revenue Code" are to the INT. REv. CODE OF 
1954, unless otherwIse Indicated. 
6. See Llewellyn, Estate and Gift Tax Reform: Inter Vivos Transfers With A Testa-
mentary Flavor, 13 WM. & MARy L. REv. 553 (1972). 
7. INT. REv. CoDE .OF 1954, § 2037 deals WIth transfers takmg effect m possessIOn or 
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in a closely held corporation is the subject of the transfer, and where 
the attendant loss of voting rights would divest the settlor of control. 
In Byrum, the Court dealt with a gift of stock in three unlisted cor-
porations to an Irrevocable trust for the benefit of the grantor's children. 
In the event of their death before the terminatlon of the trust, the re-
mainder was to pass to their surviving children.s The power to pay 
or withhold income was vested excluslvely in an mdependent trustee.V 
However, the settlor retained the right to vote the shares of stock held 
in trust.10 The retention of this power, when combined with his other 
holdings, enabled him to mamtain voting control of two companies.ll 
In addition, Byrum reserved the right to disapprove the sale or transfer 
of the trust assets and to remove the trustee and name another corporate 
trustee as successor.12 The Commissioner claimed that the retentlon of 
voting rights and the power to veto the sale of stock placed the transfer 
within the purview of section 2036(a) (1) and (2).13 In response, the 
executrix paid an additional tax and brought a refund action.14 The 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit15 and the Supreme COurt16 
affirmed the district court ruling in favor of the estate. 
enjoyment at death. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2038 deals WIth the settlor's retentIon 
of power to alter, amend, revoke or terminate. Although the overlap of these two sec-
tions With sectIon 2036 IS consIderable, thIs Comment will be confined to an analysis 
of sectIon 2036. For a discussion of the relatIonshIp of sectIon 2036 to sectIons 2037 and 
2038 see W WARREN & S. SURREY, FEDERAL EsTATE AND GIFl' TAXATION 257-68 (1961). 
8. 92 S. Ct. 2382, 2384 (1972). 
9.Id. 
10. Id. 
11. Control of the thIrd company would have been mamtamed even if there had 
been no reservatIon of VOtIng rIghts. The actual proportIons were: 
Company One 
Company Two 
Company Three 
Id. at 2387 n.2. 
Percentage Percentage 
Owned by Owned by 
Decedent Trust 
59 12 
35 48 
42 46 
Total 
Percentage 
Owned 
71 
83 
88 
12. 92 S. Ct. at 2385. If Byrum had retamed the power to remove the trustee and 
appomt hImself the stock would have been included ill hIS estate under section 2036 
(a) (2) or sectIon 2038. Sharpe, The Irrevocable Trust: Some Benefits and Risks Com-
pared WIth Revocable Trust: How to PrOVIde for the Possibility of Statutory and/or 
Admzmstratzve Changes, N.Y.U. 28m lNST. ON FED. TAX. 941,955 (1970). 
13. 92 S. Ct. at 2384. 
14. Byrum v. Uruted States, 311 F Supp.892 (SD. OhIo 1970). 
15. Uruted States v. Byrum, 440 F.2d 949 (6th Cir.1971). 
16. 92 S. Ct. 2382. 
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RETAINED ENJOYMENT: SECTION 2036 (a) (I) 
According to section 2036(a) (1), any gIfted property III wIuch a 
grantor has retaIlled "the possesSIOn or enjoyment .. or the rIght to 
income" durmg Ius life IS included III the grantor's estate for tax purposes. 
In Byrum, the ComffilssIOner argued that retention of votmg control 
guaranteed the grantor contmued employment as well as the rIght to 
deterffilne whether and when the corporation would be liqUIdated or 
merged. 17 According to the Comffilssloner, such retamed control 
amounted to "enjoyment" under the statute.1S 
In order to deCIde whether Byrum retamed the reqUIsite "enJoyment" 
of the transferred stock so as to subject It to estate tax, it IS first neces-
sary to determine whether the mere retention of votmg rIghts IS suffi-
cIent to trIgger the operation of section 2036(a)(I). In 1929 the 
Supreme Court in Reznecke v. Northern Trust19 held that the retentIon 
of management powers, including the power to vote stock held m trust, 
could not be classmed as "enJoyment." Northern Trust was deCIded 
under section 402 (c) of the Revenue Act of 1921, wIuch reqUITed trans-
ferred property to be mcluded m the gross estate of the grantor If the 
lifetIme disposItion was mtended to take effect III posseSSIOn or enJoy-
ment at Ius death.20 In holding that the extinguIshment of management 
powers at the death of the settlor did not constitute the passage of "pos-
sesSIOn" or "enJoyment" to the beneficiarIes, the Supreme Court held 
that retentIon of votmg rIghts was not an "enJoyment" of the gifted 
property Because section 402 (c), under wIuch Northern Trust was 
deCIded, did not contam a clause comparable to section 2036(a) (2), 
the dissent III Byrum strongly CrItiCIZed the maJorIty's reliance upon the 
case.21 ThIS obJection, however, IS not well founded, SInce sectIon 
2036 (a) (1) parallels section 402 (c), both statutes deal WIth the grantor's 
retentIOn of posseSSIOn or "enjoyment" of transferred property.22 It IS 
therefore reasonable to assume that the enactment of section 2036(a) (1) 
17. Id. at 2395. 
18.Id. 
19. 278 U.S. 339, 346 (1929). 
20. Id. at 344-45. 
21. 92 S. Ct. at 2399. 
22. The dissentIng OpInIOn In Byrum attempted to distIngUIsh Northern Trust on the 
ground that the settlor 10 that case did not have voung control. 92 S. Ct. at 2399. How-
ever, considermg the difficulty of deCIding what constItutes control In a gIven cor-
poratIon, the maJonty was prudent 10 not vIewmg thIS factor as determInatIve. 92 S. Ct. 
at 2388 n.4, 2390 n.I 0, 2391 n.13. 
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sIgnified congressional acqIDescence in the judicial interpretation of 
"enjoyment" under section 402 (C).23' 
Thus, it seems clear that the mere existence of a power to vote stock 
does not constitute "enjoyment." However, this proposition does not 
foreclose the possibility of subjecting such property to estate tax, in a 
case where the grantor abuses his power. It was argued in Byrum that 
retention of votmg rights by the grantor not only enabled him to deter-
mme whether the corporation would liquidate or merge, but also guaran-
teed his continued employment as a corporate officer.24 Assuming, argu-
endo, that voting control did give Byrum the power to make these 
decisions, the question whether such power constitutes "enJoyment'~ 
will turn on the manner and permissible extent to which it may be 
exercISed. 
The Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Estate of Holmes25 held that 
enjoyment as used ill the estate tax statute connotes "substantial present 
economic benefit rather than technical vesting of tide or estates." 26 It 
is also generally accepted that the retention of any enjoyment of the 
transferred property, as opposed to all of the enjoyment, will neverthe-
less result in estate tax liability.27 Through a literal application of these 
tax definitions of enjoyment, the Court in Byrum held that the right to 
merge or liquidate was not a "present" benefit but merely a speculative 
one.28 The Court might also have noted that the exercise of a power 
to merge or liquidate, even if present, would not necessarily bestow a 
disproportionate economic benefit upon the grantor. 
The contention that retained control of the corporation assures the 
23. A statute literally or substantially re-enactmg a prIor statute after its words 
have receIved a JudiCIal mterpretanon must be regarded as adopted WIth 
knowledge of such construcnon and WIth the intennon that It should there-
after be Interpreted In the same way. Therefore the prIor deCISIOns, In 
which the construction of the statute was settled, are bInding precedents for 
its Interpretanon after the re-enactment. 
H. BLACK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS § 75 (1912). 
24. 92 S. Ct. at 2395. 
25. 326 U.S. 480 (1946). 
26. The Regulations are in basic accord. Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-l(b)(2) (1954) pro-
VIdes: 
The "use, possesSIOn, rIght to the income, or other enJoyment of the 
transferred property" IS conSIdered as having been retained by or reserved 
to the decedent to the extent that the use, possesSIOn, right to the Income, or 
other enjoyment IS to be applied toward the discharge of a legal obligation 
of the decedent, or otherwIse for hIs pecunzary benefit. (EmphaSIS supplied). 
27. CommISSIOner v. Estate of Church, 335 U.S. 632, 645 (1949). 
28. 92 S. Ct. at 2397. 
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grantor of contmued status as a salarIed officer9 is not novel; It has 
been satisfactorily decided by the Tax Court ill sImilar cases. In 1943, 
for example, the court consIdered a SItuation ill whIch the decedent and 
her husband transferred shares ill a family-owned busmess to theIr 
children while retammg ngId control over the stock, illcluding the nght 
to vote It.30 In addition, they reserved $25,000 per year as compensation 
for negligible services, thus usurpmg corporate profits. The holding that 
the stock was properly illcluded ill the decedent's gross estate did not 
turn upon the mere retention of votmg nghts, but was mfluenced by 
the unwarranted compensation which was guaranteed by the arrange-
ment.31 Two years later, the Tax Court reached an OppOSIte result 
under slightly different conditions. In Estate of Hofford 'll. Commzs-
Stoner,32 the decedent donated corporate stock to a trust and retamed 
a yearly salary. In this case, however, the compensation reserved was 
reasonable in relation to the services actually performed and was held 
not to constitute "enjoyment" withm the meanmg of section 2036(a) (1). 
In a 1957 memorandum deCISIon the court, again emphasizing the rea-
sonableness of the settlor's yearly salary, excluded the transferred stock 
from his gross estate.33 
In considenng the employment questIon in Byrum, the Supreme Court 
apparently Ignored the standard established by the Tax Court. The 
maJonty simply held that the right to employment was not a "substan-
tial benefit" because of constramts of corporation law; the payment of 
an unwarranted salary would have subjected the director to a denvatIve 
SUIt. Although thIs conclUSIOn is not refuted by the reported facts, the 
CIrcumstances of Byrum'S employment should have been carefully ex-
ammed.34 If Byrum merely reserved reasonable compensation for hIs 
services, the beneficiaries would not be deprived of any enjoyment from 
the transferred stock and he would not be retaIrung taxable enjoyment 
29. Id. at 2395. 
30. Estate of Holland v. COmmISSIOner, 47 B.TA. 807 (1942), supplemental opmzon, 
1 T.C.564 (1943). 
31. The grantor m Estate of Holland carefully reserved control of the stock durmg 
rus lifetlme, attachmg conditIons precedent to the absolute vestIng of tItle m the grantees. 
In fact, the instrument of transfer expressly prOVIded that: "upon the death of [trans-
feror] the tItle of SaId [transferees] to SaId stock shall become absolute," and that 
"all of the prOVISIons of thts contract are to be and always construed to be conditions 
precedent to the Tzght and tItle of [transferees] m and to the stock "(EmphasIS 
supplied). 47 B.TA. 807 (1942). 
32. 4 T.C. 790 (1945). 
33. Estate of William L. Belknap, P-H 1951 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. 11 51,243. 
34. See text followmg note 56 mfra. 
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for himself by means of a wrongful appropriation. On the other hand, 
if the threat of a derivative suit was illusory, and in fact the salary 
stemmed from control, the Court should have found that taxable enJoy-
ment resulted. This approach to the problem yields a result consistent 
with pnor Tax Court holdings without openmg a loophole for settlors 
who desire to retain enjoyment of transferred property by means of 
corporate manipulation. 
The Court ill Byrum thus reaffirmed the Northern Trust rationale 
that management powers do not inherently constitute enjoyment. In 
addition, without any inquiry into the presence of abuse, they extended 
that principle to indicate that even specific benefits derived from such 
powers will not be considered "enjoyment," where sufficient constraints 
agamst abusive appropriation are present. 
It would be unrealistic to ignore the fact that management powers 
over gifted assets can be of indirect benefit to the manager. It would 
be equally improper to conclude absolutely that the mere possibility 
of wrongful appropriation or misuse necessitates the finding of a taxable 
retention of enjoyment. The difficulties inherent in any case-by-case 
treatment are of course to be considered, but the judicial effort required 
in using the approach of the Tax Court is no more problematic than 
the method already utilized in the policing of unreasonable compensa-
tion in income tax cases. 
RIGHT TO DESIGNATE: SECTION 2036(a) (2) 
Revenue Ruling 67-54 established the ComInissioner's position that 
where a donor retains effective control over the issuer's dividend policy, 
a gift of nonvotIng stock constitutes a proscribed transfer under 2036 
(a)(2). This de facto concept of a "right to designate" was flatly re-
jected in Byrum when Justice Powell observed that "[t]he use of the 
term 'right' implies that restraints on power are to be recognized and 
that such restraints deprive the person exercising the power of a right 
to do so." 35 In other words, the Court began its reasoning by defining 
the term "right" within the meaning of section 2036(a) (2) as an un-
constrained power or discretion. 
Historically, the "right to designate" problem has arisen in caseg36 
35. 92 S. Ct. at 2392 n.14. 
36. Michigan Trust Co. v. Kavanaugh, 284 F.2d 502 (6th Cit. 1960); Estate of Hays 
v. CommisSIoner, 181 F.2d 169 (5th Cit. 1950); Jenrungs v. Smith, 161 F.2d 74 (2d Cit. 
1947); Delaney v. Uruted States, 264 F. Supp. 904 (W D. Ark. 1967); Estate of Patdee. 
49 T.C. 140 (1967); Estate of Wier, 17 T.C. 409 (1951); Estate of Wilson, 13 T.C. 869 
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where the grantor appomted hunself trustee while reservmg the power 
to invade the trust corpus for the benefit of the mcome beneficiaries.37 
In this context, courts have rejected the argument that reservation of any 
discretionary power in the grantor is a "right to designate." Rather, 
they have developed a test to determme when discretlon ceases to be a 
"rIght." 
The landmark case of Jenmngs v. Smtth,38 the first to articulate such 
a standard, held that where the grantor's powers over trust assets are 
subject to the limitatlons of determmable external standards, the reten-
tlon of such rIghts will not VIolate the underlymg policies of sectlon 
2036(a) (2).39 The application of the Jenmngs test to a mulutude of 
factual situatlons has not been uruform.40 But, m spite of the disagree-
ment over preCIsely when a trust instrument prOVIdes a sufficiently ascer-
tamable standard, the courts agree that even a reserved power to divert 
income from one beneficiary to another (which seemingly IS Withm 
the express proscrIptlon of the statute) is not a "rIght" in the sense of 
section 2036 if a standard IS in fact ascertainable.41 Although the facts 
(1949), atf'd per curzam, 187 F.2d 145 (3d Cir. 1951); Estate of Yawkey, 12 T.C. 1164 
(1949); Estate of Frew, 8 T.C. 1240 (1947); Estate of Budlong, 7 T.C. 756 (1946), affd 
m part and rev'd In part on other grounds sub nom. IndustrIal Trust Co. v. ComnussIOner, 
165 F.2d 142 (1st Cir. 1947); Estate of Matson, 3 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 309 (1944). ct. 
Budd v. CommIssIoner, 49 T.C. 468 (1968), where the court began Its analySIs by staung: 
Decedent was a trustee so that the powers granted to the trustees of 
that trust must be consIdered held by hIm for purposes of [§ 2036(a) (2)], 
even though they were exercIsable only In hIS fidUCIary capaCIty. 
The quesnon remams, however, whether the powers granted the trustees In 
those two trust agreements left the decedent WIth "the rIght to deSIgnate 
the persons to possess or enJoy the property or the mcome therefrom." 
37. It should be noted that m those cases the grantor had retaIned conSIderably more 
direct power than that attributed to Byrum so that the reasonmg of those cases should 
be clearly applicable m Byrum. 
38. 161 F.2d 74 (2d Cir.1947). 
39. Id. at 78. 
40. In some of these cases the reasomng of the courts has been clear. For example In 
Estate of Markson, 3 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 309 (1944), the grantor's power to Invade 
corpus for the beneficIary's "comfort and happmess" failed to prOVIde a standard whxch 
an eqwty court could apply to Iinut the grantor's discretIon. The same result was 
reached ill Hurd v. COmmISSIOner, 160 F.2d 610 (Ist Cir. 1947), where mvaSIon was 
allowed "if CIrcumstances so reqwred." In Estate of Wier, 17 T.C. 409 (I951), the power 
to Invade corpus to mamtaIn, support, and educate the beneficIary "in the manner ap-
proprIate to her stanon m life" was held to prOVIde an ascertaInable standard. Accord, 
Estate of Budlong, 7 T.C. 756 (1946) ("SIckness and emergency" held to constItute an 
ascertamable standard). Compare Estate of Hays v. Comnussloner, 181 F.2d 169 (5th Cir. 
1950), 'WIth Estate of Yawkey, 12 T.C. 1164 (1949), reachmg opposIte conclUSIOns on 
the same language. 
41. See, e.g., Jenmngs v. SmIth, 161 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1947). 
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in Byrum do not involve a trustee's reserved power to invade the trust 
corpus, the Jennings line of cases demonstrates by analogy that Byrum's 
retained control will not constitute a right to designate if the Court is 
able to find an ascertainable standard limiting the power. Indeed, the 
Court found such a standard based upon the constraints of applicable 
trnst principles and corporate law. 
Corporate Constraints on Grantor 
Jennings and the other "ascertainable standards" cases could have been 
cited had the majority in Byrum examined the facts presented and rec-
ognized that a trustee-beneficIary problem was.raised. The Court con-
cerned itself with a different type of fiduciary obligation-that of a 
controlling stockholder to the mmority. Consequendy, Justice Powell 
argued that even though Byrum (in his capacity of controlling stock-
holder) and the corporation directors were not obligated to consider 
the relationship between income beneficiaries and remaindermen within 
the trust, they were under a duty to the trust itself (a minority stock-
holder) to pay dividends when financial circumstances so warranted. 
Recognizing the chilling effect of a suit by the trustee against the serdor 
for wrongful action either as a director or as a shareholder, the majority 
was unwilling to equate Byrum's alleged power with the "right to desig-
nate" under section 7.036. 
The government a:J.d the dissent had no strong counter argument to 
Powell's reasoning at this juncture.42 The heart of the argument, as in 
the ascertainable standards cases, concerned the Court's application of 
the test to the factual situation presented. The majority stressed the 
restraining influence caused by the economic realities of small corpora-
tions. The fiduciary obligations of directors, and the duties of majority 
stockholders which prevent them from placing their own interests above 
those of the corporation were deemed sufficient to preclude the personal 
exercise of the voting powers retained.4s The dissent asserted that al-
though these factors presented a modicum of restraint, Byrum never-
42. See Justice White's dissent in Byrum where he states: "I do not deny the ex-
istence of such constramts, but their restraming effect on an otherwise tempting gross 
abuse of the corporate dividend power hardly guts the great power of a controlling 
director to accelerate or retard, enlarge or dimmish most diVIdends." 92 S. Ct. at 2382. 
43. The argument is that m the typICal closely-held corporation, dividend policy is 
dictated almost entirely by such factors as the availability of net earnings, the need 
for retained earnmgs, access to capital markets, etc., all of which are "ignored at the 
directors' peril.'" 
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theless retamed sufficIent latltude to divert the flow of ,divIdends44 
and, as a consequence, to effect the distribution of mco,me' betWeen 
income beneficianes and remaindermen. ThIs was, and will contlnue 
to be, the government's strongest argument. But adoptlng thIs approach 
in definmg "right to desIgnate" supplies no objective means of deter-
mming when practlcal constramts on power are suffiCIent to· preclude 
the finding of a "nght." , 
Constramts Imposed by Trust Prznctples 
Even if the government had carned Its argument that Byrum con-
trolled corporate diVIdend policy, that Issue loses sigruficance if Byrum'S 
control over diSpOSItlOn of trust assets IS constramed. Clearly, the power 
to veto all sales of trust assets was cruCIal to the government's "right 
to deSIgnate" argument. Had that power not eXIsted, the unlimIted 
power of disposition in the trustee would have effectlvely checked the 
grantor's control over the beneficIal enjoyment of the trust. ThIS IS true 
because the remvestment of trust assets could completely sever any 
power retamed by the grantor. 
In an analogous line of cases,45 the COmmISSIOner has conSIstently 
contended that the retentlon of broad management powers by a grantor 
enables hIm to deSIgnate the persons who are to receIve trust income. 
Under thIs rationale, the "nght" allegedly arIses from the power to 
select mvestments in growth stocks to favor the remamdermen or con-
versely to purchase other assets to favor the mcome benefiCIary. If By-
rum's control over corporate diVIdend policy enabled hIm to transform 
the trust corpus (stocks frozen m trust by means of hIs veto power) mto 
high or low YIeld securItleS, the exerCIse of such discretion could deter-
mme indirectly whether the trust would pay mcome or accumulate 
earnings. Yet m the management power cases,46 where this identical 
44. Perhaps the dissent's best argument on thIS pomt IS that eqUIty courts are loath 
to mterfere WIth the corporate director's discretIon and will accept almost any excuse 
to aVOId domg so. See W CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CoRPORATIONS 17 (4th ed. 1969). 
ThIs pomt 15 partIcularly nnportant because the whole "ascertamable standards" con-
cept 15 dependent upon the willingness of eqUIty courts to step m and enforce the 
standards. 
45. See, e.g., Old Colony Trust Co. v. UnIted States, 423 F.2d 601 (1st Cir. 1970); 
UnIted States v. Powell, 307 F.2d 821 (10th Cir. 1962); Budd V CommIssIoner, 49 T.C. 
468 (1968); Estate of Peters, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 994 (1964); Estate of King, 37 T.C. 
973 (1962); Estate of Wurts, 1960 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. ~ 60,102; Estate of Wilson, 
13 T.C. 869 (1949), aff'd per curtam, 187 F.2d 143 (3d Cir. 1951); Estate of Neal, 8 T.G. 
237 (1947); Estate of Hall, 6 T.C. 933 (1946); Estate of Downe, 2 T.C. 967 (1943). 
46. Cases CIted ill note 45 supra. 
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power has been challenged, the lower courts have held consistendy that 
section 2036 is not operative, since there are restraints inherent in the 
grantor's role as a fiducIary.47 In Estate of Willard V. King,48 the Tax 
Court stated: 
It IS our concluslOn that LTl so far as the management of the 
trust lO the lOstant case was concerned, the grantor had zn effect 
made hzmself a fiduciary, and that under the law of New York 
he was not at liberty to adrrunister the trust for his own benefit or 
to Ignore the nghts of the beneficIaries, even though he no doubt 
would be perIDltted wide latitude in the exercise of his discretion 
as to the types of investments to be made.49 
Apparendy the court in King answered the initial question-whether 
management powers were reserved for the benefit of the trust bene-
ficiarIes or for the benefit of the grantor-by interpreting the trust in-
strument and looking to the intent of the grantor.50 Since it found that 
the power was reserved for the benefit of the trust beneficiaries, the 
court examined applicable state laWS1 for an enumeration of duties 
imposed on a grantor ill such a situation. The rule that retention of 
investment powers by the grantor carries with it a fiduciary prohibition 
against frustrating the purposes of the trust is either stated or assumed52 
in all the management powers cases. 53 Accordingly, since Byrum's re-
47. State Street Trust Co. v. Uruted States, 263 F.2d 635 (1st Cir. 1959), IS the one 
apparent exception to this statement. In that case the grantor had retamed not only 
normal mvestment powers, but also the rIght to invest m non-legals, the nght to clas-
sify gain as income or prmcipal, and several other powers. The court held that while 
the powers nught be pemussible mdividually, when accumulated they were enough to 
make the corpus taxable under section 2036 (a) (2). The case IS apparently an abberanon 
and has never been followed. In 1970 It was overruled by Old Colony Trust Co. 'Il. 
United States, 423 F.2d 601 (lst Cir. 1970). 
48. 37 T.C. 973 (1962). 
49. ld. at 980 (emphasIS supplied). 
50. See also Cushman v. ComnusslOner, 153 F.2d 510, 514 (2d Cir. 1946), where the 
court held: "It is a quesnon of interpretanon whether or not the powers reserved as 
grantor are held in a fidUCIary capaCIty or for the grantor's own purposes." Accord, 
Fifth Ave. Bank v. Nunan, 59 F Supp.753 (ED.N.Y.1945). 
51. Carrier v. Carner, 226 N.Y. 114, 123 N.E. 135 (1919). 
52. Covey, SectIon 2036-The New Problem Child of the Federal Estate Tax, 4 TAX 
COUNSELOR'S Q.121, 148 (1960). 
53. But see Uruted States v. Powell, 307 F.2d 821 (10th Cir. 1962); Estate of Peters, 
23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 994 (1964); Estate of Wurts, 1960 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. ~ 
60,102. The grantors were the trustees and It was unnecessary to attribute such dunes 
to them. 
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tamed right to veto all sales or acqrusitIons of trust assets is Just such a 
management power, he lIDplicitly assumed the duty not to use the power 
to defeat the purposes of the trust. 
The question therefore is whether Byrum's fidUCIary obligations are 
suffiCIent to restram hIID from usmg rus veto to enforce any shIfting of 
interests WIthIn the trust which Illight result from rus "control" of cor-
porate dividend policy. According to the Restatement of Trusts,54 
investment powers of a fidUCIary must be exercIsed impartially between 
income beneficiaries and remamdermen.55 Thus, any exerCISe of Byrum's 
veto power would be restramed by a court of eqUIty to the extent that 
he attempted to reallocate mterests witrun the trust. In sum, smce the 
government's theory requITed that Byrum have both corporate power 
(over divIdends), and trust power (over transfer of assets), trus addi-
tional check on his veto power makes its posltlon untenable. 
Summary Judgment 
The question whether Byrum's mfluence over diVIdend policy was, 
as a practical matter, suffiCIently constramed by external standards to 
prevent rus abuse of discretIon, was the pnmary focus m the major-
ity'S "nght to designate" analYSIS. In trus regard, the fact that the case 
was deCIded on cross-motions for summary Judgment may be sIgmficant. 
In discussmg the effect of economic factors upon the payment of divi-
dends, Justice Powell of necesSIty was refernng to a typIcal situation 
involving a small corporatIon. 56 Had the speCIfic facts been available, 
it Illight have been found that the finanCIal posture of the corporations 
did allow consIderable latitude m makmg diVIdend policy. The issue 
then would have been narrowed to whether the respective fiduciary 
obligations allowed Byrum any real discretion. In that event the case 
would have been clearly analogous to the "ascertamable standards" 
54. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS (1935). 
55. ld. § 232 states: 
If a trust IS created for benefiCIarIes In succeSSIOn, the trustee IS under a 
duty to the successlve benefiCIarIes to act WIth due regard to theIr respectIve 
mterests. 
(d) Although the trustee IS not under a duty to the benefiCIary en-
tItled to the Income to endanger the prmcIpal In order to produce a 
large Income, he IS under a duty to hIm not to sacrifice Income for the 
purpose of Increasmg the value of the prInCIpal. Thus, the trustee tS 
under a duty to a life benefictary not to purchase or retazn unproduc-
tzve property (EmphasIS supplied). 
56. 92 S. Ct. at 2392. 
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cases,57 and the unpact of the Court's holdings would have been clear. 
As the case stands, the additional factor of economic constraints is suffi-
cient to cloud the relationslnp between Byrum and the "ascertainable 
standards" cases. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The Supreme Court's treatment of the "right to designate" issue under 
section 2036(a) (2) will reinforce the lower court deCIsions in the "as-
certainable standards" cases and the "management power" cases. In light 
of the obvious dissImilarity of the powers retained by Byrum to the 
disguised testamentary dispositions at which section 2036(a) (2) was 
auned, the holding in tins case certamly is consistent with the Congres-
sional mandate. There are, however, no objective means of determming 
at what point the fiduciary obligatIons of company directors, coupled 
with economic considerations, will be substantial enough to curtail the 
donor-majorIty stockholder's discretion in "controlling" dividend pol-
ICY. To further complicate the situation, the case was decided on cross-
motions for summary judgment, thus preventing the Court from con-
sidering a specific fact situation to provide an exemplar upon winch 
these tests could operate. As a result, an extremely amorphous test has 
arISen and no clear statement of its application has been presented. 
Although the approach taken by the Court in defining the phrase 
"right to desIgnate" was well reasoned as far as It went, the decision 
could have had greater impact had an attempt been made to ascertain 
what Congress intended to proscribe by the use of that phrase.58 It is 
clear that the general purpose of section 2036 (a) and its predecessors has 
been to prevent estate tax avoidance by the use of testamentary disposi-
tions disguised m the form of an incomplete mter vivos gift. The history 
of this section indicates that in its present form It is a mere patchwork 
of amendments tailored to meet speCIfic situations in order to effectuate 
the law's basic purpose. A prime example IS the 1931 amendment to the 
Revenue Act of 1926, which was rushed through Congress in one day 
to overrule three Supreme Court decisions adverse to the government.59 
57. See cases CIted note 36 supra & accompanymg text. 
58. See generally Murtagh, The Role of the Courts m the Interpretation of the In-
ternal Revenue Code, 24 TAX LAWYER 523 (1971). 
59. The only record of legIslauve intent, statements made on the floor of the House 
of Representauves, clearly mdicate that the bill was a response to McCormIck v. Burnett, 
283 U.S. 784 (1931); Morsman v. Burnett, 283 U.S. 783 (1931); and Burnett v. Northern 
Trust Co., 283 U.S. 782 (1931). The Comnussloner of Internal Revenue apparendy was 
238 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW 
It has been widely recogruzed60 that the wording of secuon 2036 
(a) (2) was msprred solely by one case, McCormzck 'V. Burnett,61 and 
that It was mtended to do no more than tax trusts over wruch the grantor 
retamed a speczfic and direct rIght to deSIgnate the mcome beneficIarIes. 
Yet m the lower courts62 It has been ImplicItly assumed that Congress 
also mtended to reach mdirect powers; otherwIse, the Issue of the ex-
IStence of such powers would never have been reached. In Byrum, the 
Supreme Court's approach to the defimuon of "rIght to deSIgnate" was 
obviously based on the same unstated assumpuon. 
Certamly from the pomt of VIew of the estate planner who desrres 
more certainty m the estate tax laws, It would have been preferable for 
the Court to have treated the questIOn by mqurrmg mto congressIOnal 
mtent. Had the Court recognized that such powers as Byrum retamed 
and as eXisted m the management power cases (wruch affect the relauve 
interests of income beneficiarIes and remamdermen only indirectly) were 
never mtended to be witrun reach of section 2036(a) (2), the question 
would have been handed back to Congress. In all probability we would 
have witnessed a re-run of the passage of the 1931 amendment,G3 but 
the possibility eXists that Congress would have seriously reconSIdered 
the underlymg policy conSIderations of trus secuon. 
so disturbed over the three declSlons that he IInmediately drafted a letter to the House 
Ways and Means Comnuttee requestIng that It amend sectlon 302 of the 1926 Act 
to Insure that any reserved life Interests In mter VIVOS transfers would be taxable. The 
bill was pushed through both houses m one day under suspenSIOn of the rules, and the 
PreSIdent sIgned It mto law the evemng after the deCISIons were handed down. Con-
sequendy, there was no comnuttee report and the bill was not pnnted. From the con-
versatlons on the floor of the House, however, the conclUSIOn IS mescapable that the 
amendment was mtended to do no more than meet those specific deCISIOns. 74 CONGo 
FlEe. 7198 (1931). 
60. See, e.g., IndustrIal Trust Co. v. ComITIlSsioner, 165 F.2d 142 (1st Cir. 1947) 
(dissentlng 0pImon); Gray & Covey, supra note 3; Covey, supra note 52. But see Ped-
nck, supra note 3. 
61. 283 U.S. 784 (1931). 
62. See case cIted notes 36 & 45 supra. 
63. See note 59 supra. 
